Social constraints are an unexplored dimension of schooling decisions in developing countries. We focus on two such constraints in the context of rural South Asia: seclusion practices limiting female mobility and stigma based on caste a¢ liation. Using a novel data-set from Pakistan that explicitly recognizes the geographic structure of villages and the social structure of their constituent settlements, we …nd: First, the odds of ever enrolling in school are a lot lower for girls who have to cross settlement boundaries to attend, irrespective of distance, an e¤ect not present for boys. Second, low-caste children, both boys and girls, are deterred from enrolling when the most convenient school is in a settlement dominated by high-caste households.
Introduction
In much of the developing world, rural settlements are segregated along ethnic, tribal, clan, or caste lines, hence their geographic boundaries are inevitably also communal ones. Crossing these boundaries, from socially familiar to more alien territory, may entail psychic costs, and these costs have hitherto unexplored economic implications. Public service delivery, in particular, typically involves a discrete investment; the construction of a school or a health clinic, for instance. Since it is usually not economical to provide every settlement with such a facility, many must choose whether to cross communal boundaries, and bear the resulting cost, to access public services. The welfare-maximizing allocation of facilities should, therefore, take into account patterns of social fragmentation.
Social constraints arising from one's community a¢ liation have, until recently, remained largely outside the purview of economics. However, two emerging strands of empirical literature-the …rst concerned with the costs of social fragmentation (see Alesina In this paper, we estimate the salience of boundary-crossing for school enrollment behavior in rural Pakistan. We do so using a novel data-set that explicitly recognizes the geographic structure of villages and the social structure of their constituent settlements. Two features of Pakistani society are central to our analysis. The …rst, the custom of purdah or female seclusion, restricts women's and girl's access to public spaces, but is more rigidly enforced outside of the immediate community than within it. The second feature involves the di¤erentiation of status arising from caste hierarchy, marking certain groups in the community as "unclean" and hence subject to discrimination and ostracism by higher status groups. In this setting, the dominance of a community by one caste-type becomes critical, determining the extent to which high-status types can enforce exclusionary norms on low-status types (see also Anderson, 2009 , who exploits the idea of caste dominance within Indian villages in a very di¤erent context). Our empirical analysis, therefore, centers around the location of schools relative to community boundaries and the caste composition of communities in which schools are located vis à vis the caste of the child who might potentially attend them.
Male-female di¤erences is educational attainment remain stubbornly large in rural Pakistan, as in much of south Asia (Filmer et al., 1998) . Economic explanations for male-bias in human capital investment usually appeal to gender di¤erentials in the perceived returns (e.g., Schultz, 1982, Behrman et al., 1999) , which may incorporate parents' greater reliance on sons for old-age support (Das Gupta, 1987) . But lower returns to education may only be part of the story behind lagging female enrollment; higher costs of school attendance could also play a signi…cant role. Likewise, in rural Pakistan, the school enrollment gap favoring high-caste children over low-caste children is nearly as large as that between boys and girls. Recent experimental work on caste in India by Ho¤ and Pandey (2006) emphasizes how a history of discrimination shapes personal aspirations and, ultimately, performance. As a result, low-caste households might have lower demand for education, conditional on wealth and school availability, than their high-caste counterparts. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) , meanwhile, have shown that lowcaste households, having looser ties to ancestral kin networks, perceive a greater return to education and consequent integration into the modern economy (see also Luke and Munshi, 2007) . We contribute to this literature by asking just how much of the observed caste-enrollment gap is due to greater barriers to school enrollment faced by low-caste children-i.e., due to the fact that many of the schools available to them are in settlements where high-castes dominate. Our evidence shows that, controlling for distance to school, the odds of ever enrolling are substantially lower for girls who would need to cross settlement boundaries to attend, an e¤ect not present for boys and one that does not appear to be an artifact of school allocation decisions. When we distinguish children by their caste, however, the crossing-boundary e¤ect turns out only to be relevant for highstatus girls. By contrast, low-caste children, both boys and girls, are deterred from enrolling when the most convenient school is in a settlement dominated by high-caste households. Thus, low-caste girls, the most educationally disadvantaged group, would achieve substantially higher enrollment rates if given access to casteconcordant schools, whether these schools are placed inside or outside their own settlement. Indeed, a policy of building village schools designed to serve low-caste children would increase overall enrollment far more cost-e¤ectively than a policy of placing a school in every currently unserved settlement.
The next section describes the data used in our empirical analysis. Section 3 lays out the context, describing the structure of villages, the nature of female seclusion norms, and the salience of caste. Sections 4 and 5 present our empirical framework and results and section 6 summarizes our …ndings and their policy implications.
Data
Our analysis combines representative household survey data with information from a village and school census undertaken in the two most populous provinces of Pakistan, Punjab and Sindh. The household data come from the second round of the Pakistan Rural Household Survey (PRHS-II) conducted in 2004-05, in which 3519 households were randomly drawn from 165 villages. The school census collects detailed information on all schools inside each of these villages as well as schools lying within a 2 km walk of the perimeter of each settlement/habitation of the village. 1 GPS coordinates are available for households and schools, so the distance between each can be calculated. The hamlet in which households and schools are located is also known. The PRHS-II village census provides land ownership data and caste/clan (zaat/biradari) a¢ liation of every household in each of the 165 villages.
The school census identi…es 1326 schools of which 1112 (84%) have classes at the elementary level (up to grade 5). Of these, 63% are exclusively elementary schools, while the rest had an elementary school attached to a middle or high school. Since three-fourths of elementary schools are public (90% in Sindh province alone), the government's school allocation decision is central in determining access to education. Among elementary schools, 51% are coeducational, 28% are exclusively for boys and 21% exclusively for girls. Public elementary schools are far more likely to be singlesex; 38% are coed compared to 87% of private ones. With regard to location, 61% of elementary schools in the census lie inside a sample village and 56% lie inside a particular settlement within a village. Pure elementary schools are far more likely to be located inside a settlement within a village, but there is no di¤erence among public and private schools in this respect.
We consider all children who were age 9-18 in the survey year; practically all of the children who ever enroll in school have already done so by the age of nine. Married girls in this age range, of which there are few, are excluded. The initial enrollment decisions of these girls would have depended on conditions in their natal homes rather than in their current residence. These criteria yield a sample of 6322 children, of which 2,914 (46%) are girls and 3408 (54%) are boys. Since the boy-girl ratio is stable across age-cohorts, the overall dearth of girls does not appear to be the result of their exclusion from the sample due to early marriage. Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for the sample, highlighting, in particular, the importance of the school entry margin in rural Pakistan. Also evident is the substantial gender gap in schooling, one that varies tremendously by region. In the more developed North Punjab, 92% of boys and 83% girls had enrolled in school by age nine, whereas the poorer southern part of Punjab and the entire province of Sindh have much lower enrollment rates (around 50% for girls) and huge gender gaps favoring boys (19 and 27 percentage points, respectively). By contrast, dropout rates from primary school are much less di¤erentiated by gender and region, perhaps because many girls who would have dropped out never entered school to begin with. Conditional on having enrolled in school and not completed the primary grades, 82% of boys are still in school compared to 74% of girls, with gender gaps of 7, 6, and 10 percentage points in North Punjab, South Punjab, and Sindh, respectively. 2 
Context
The term "village" in much of Pakistan, and indeed in large parts of south Asia, has a dual connotation. On the one hand, the administrative or revenue village is the lowest tier of the government's administrative structure, at which public services, such as schools and health workers, are allocated. Most administrative or revenue villages, however, consist of several distinct clusters of habitations or hamlets; though most residents would also refer to these as "villages", we will call them "settlements." Among the 165 PHRS-II villages, for example, our village census records 1031 named settlements. However, villages of North Punjab typically are less geographically dispersed and have much fewer settlements than those of Southern Punjab and Sindh (see Table 2 below). As the census data will also show, settlements are much more strongly segregated in terms of ethnicity and caste than 2 Beyond primary school, strong gender-region di¤erences in dropout rates re-emerge. Conditional on having completed primary school but being less than 17 years-old, 76% of boys are still enrolled in school compared to 71% of girls, with region-speci…c gender gaps of 4, 13, and 24 percentage points, respectively. Since post-primary school enrollment, conditional on reaching that decision point, is driven more by the location of middle schools than of primary schools, we will have little more to say about it in this paper. their upstream revenue villages, lending salience to their geographical boundaries.
Seclusion practices and mobility constraints
Seclusion of women (purdah) is practiced widely and in varying degrees throughout rural Pakistan. As they enter puberty, girls usually experience increased enforcement of purdah norms and attendant restrictions on mobility and social interaction. Limits on mobility for young unmarried girls include prohibitions on traveling unaccompanied or the need to obtain permission to do so from a male family member. These mobility constraints stem from desire to maintain family honor (izzat), which, in a conservative society, is intimately bound up with female reputation and hence behavior, whether real or perceived. Unchaperoned travel outside the immediate con…nes of the village and, especially, the settlement can invite damage to a girl's reputation.
Among households living in close proximity with long standing familial, caste, or patronage ties, as would typically be the case within a settlement, there would tend to be less harassment of each others womenfolk than of those from other settlements. Support for this claim is found in the PRHS-II, where all married women age 15-40 were asked about their perception of safety within and outside their own settlement as well as their use of any type of veil or purdah in public. 3 While 80% of women report feeling "safe"alone inside their own settlement, only 27% report feeling safe alone outside of it. Similarly, only 14% of women report practicing full purdah (coverage of whole body including face) out in public within their own settlement compared to 31% outside their settlement. Thus, settlement boundaries appear to matter as far as female reputational risk is concerned.
Other data point to mobility restrictions as a key constraint on schooling for girls. The nationally representative Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS) of 2001-02 shows that enrollment decisions for girls in rural areas are more responsive than those of boys to proximity to school (see World Bank, 2005), but this analysis does not account for settlement boundary-crossing. More suggestive evidence comes from the 2001-02 PRHS-I, in which parents of children never enrolled were asked the main reason for the child's non-enrollment. For boys, far and away the most important reason is economic ("school too expensive" cited by 43% of parents), but the picture is quite di¤erent for girls. While economic motives still dominate (32% reported "school too expensive"), social constraints become an important consideration. Respondents were much more likely to report that they did not "approve" of their non-enrolled daughters going to school (30%) than to disapprove of schooling for non-enrolled sons (7.5%).
Field interviews conducted in …ve villages randomly selected, by region, from the PRHS-II sample also highlight the importance of mobility constraints for girls school enrollment, as the following quotes illustrate: 4 "...I took my daughters out of school because it was too far to walk and I feel that things are not safe there..."(Woman, Southern Punjab).
"When sons go to schools that are far away we don't get worried, but for our daughter we get worried."(Women, Southern Punjab).
"The problem is, when children are so small to attend primary school, we cannot expect them to walk all the way to a school in another settlement or another village. But when they grow a bit more mature, 8-9 yrs, we cannot send girls alone to walk this distance. There are tall sugarcane …elds and all the way is deserted except young boys, who use the same route for going to school. This is very dangerous! The boys tease young girls -anyone could push a little child, girl or boy in the …elds, one would not even know! (High-caste women, Southern Punjab)
Caste and Stigma
Caste has received scant attention in Pakistan, from any disciplinary perspective. Indeed, the PRHS-II is the …rst large-scale survey, as far as we are aware, to collect systematic data on caste a¢ liation in rural Pakistan. While caste groupings in Pakistan cannot be precisely mapped into the much more extensively studied social hierarchy of neighboring India, there are signi…cant similarities between the two due to their long shared history. In particular, castes arose from occupational di¤erences in which notions of status and of purity and pollution are embedded. Various exclusionary norms follow from these hierarchies and are exercised in relations of mutual assistance, in social networks, and in the establishment and maintenance of political power within the village economy and without. Unlike the Indian context, there has been no o¢ cial acknowledgement of caste-based discrimination in Pakistan and thus no a¢ rmative action programs to mitigate its impacts. Caste mobility through land transactions is also extremely limited.
We construct a caste-status identi…er that categorizes dozens of distinctly named caste/clan (zaat/biradari) groups into "high" and "low" caste. High-caste includes all such groups that self-identify on the basis of traditional access to land (zamindars). The low-caste group comprises zaats that were historically considered either out-castes (similar to the dalits in India) or were in clientalist relationships with zamindars as providers of services in the village economy; i.e. barbers, metalworkers, clothes washers, etc. Based on this de…nition, around 20% of sample children are from low-caste households, with the highest proportion (29%) found in Sindh province (see Table 1 ). 5 Village census data, summarized in Table 2 , provide insight into residential patterns by caste in rural Pakistan. Villages typically contain many more distinctly named zaat/biradari groups than do their constituent settlements. Moreover, while more than half of all settlements are comprised of just one caste-type (mostly high), this is true of just 3% of villages. In short, settlements are far more segregated along caste/clan lines than villages.
We de…ne a caste-type as dominant if it owns the majority of land in the settlement, based on land shares calculated from village census data. Anderson (2009), citing Dumont's (1970) emphasis on economic power rather than numerical preponderance, uses precisely this de…nition of caste dominance for her study of Indian villages. Of the 507 settlements from which our sample children are drawn, only 36 (15%) are low-caste dominant, re ‡ecting both the smaller low-caste population and their lower landownership. 6 All but …ve of these settlements are located in Southern Punjab or Sindh. Among the low-caste children in our sample, 48% reside in high-caste dominant settlements. By contrast, only 6% of high-caste children live in low-caste dominant settlements. Qualitative evidence gathered from …eld interviews documents how caste-based stigma plays out in schools either to exclude low-caste children altogether or to make them unwelcome. The following snippets are typical:
"No, there is no school for girls here. Our zamindar got a teacher appointed, mainly for children of his own zaat [high caste]. There is no building for school. Children, both boys and girls sit in the verandah of his [meeting room] to study." (Low-caste women, Sindh) "As the school for girls is closed since about two years, the [highcaste] girls are taught primary classes in the boys school. Our daughters cannot attend classes together with the [high-caste] girls. So our girls are not attending any school currently..." (Low-caste women, Sindh)
"The children of rich [high castes] are taught seriously but our children are paid no attention to. Teachers treat children from poor households really badly. While our daughters have no access to the school at all, our boys receive no attention from the teachers. All boys sit together for classes but our boys sit on the ‡oor." (Low-caste women, Sindh)
"They let the daughters of [high castes] use the latrines, but tell our daughters to use the …elds because you stink." (Low-caste women, Southern Punjab)
"The teachers make the daughters of [high castes] sit inside the rooms, under the fans. Our poor children sit outside, under the sun and dust." (Low-caste women, Southern Punjab)
Enrollment decisions
To avoid excessive notation, we verbally sketch a model of school entry. The decision is, …rst and foremost, a forward looking one, since completing each level or grade has an option value consisting of the net return to going on to the next level. However, there is also a cost to attending school, which includes: (i) direct school fees and other monetary outlays, (2) foregone labor in the home, (3) disutility of walking to school, and (4) psychic cost of social pressure, stigma, reputational harm, etc.
We have argued that purdah restrictions on girls come into force at the onset of puberty, which occurs in the later primary school or early middle school years. Yet, there are a couple of reasons to believe that mobility constraints a¤ect the primary school enrollment decision. First, reputational risk to the family is still a concern for younger girls. Allowing them unfettered mobility may signal a loose attitude about female honor in general, with repercussions for other womenfolk. Second, because the decision to enroll a child is driven in large part by the option value of future schooling, and because schooling is costly, anything that raises the likelihood of dropping out of primary school in the future will reduce the incentive to enroll at the outset.
With these considerations in mind, we state our two main hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Holding constant travel time to school, a girl who would have to cross settlement boundaries to attend school will be less likely to enroll than a girl who can attend a school in her own settlement. The same crossingboundary e¤ect should not be observed for boys.
Hypothesis 2: Children will be more likely to be enrolled in school if their caste status coincides with that of the dominant caste of the settlement containing their most convenient school (child-school caste concordance).
Salience of Settlement Boundaries 4.1 Empirical strategy
We use household and school GPS coordinates, and information on the year of school establishment, to identify the location of each primary school that was available in or near the child's village by the time the child turned 9. As new schools are established (and old ones closed down), the set of available schools can di¤er between two children of di¤erent ages living in the same settlement. Moreover, since singlesex schools are common in Pakistan, the set of available schools will also vary within settlements by the gender of the child. From this information, we can construct the two key variables for our test of hypothesis 1:
where settlement s of village v is that in which child i resides, and
If there are multiple schools available within the settlement, we chose the nearest one to child i for the calculation of d isv :
The summary statistics in Table 1 show that around three-quarters of children in our sample had an appropriate type of school available in their settlement at the time they were nine years-old. While gender di¤erences in isv are negligible, the regional di¤erences are stark: 89% of children had access to inside-settlement schools in North Punjab, a …gure which drops to 50% in Southern Punjab with its much greater proliferation of settlements in a typical village. To separate the crossingboundary e¤ect from the e¤ect of distance it is important that the distribution of d isv conditional on isv = 1 share common support with the distribution of d isv conditional on isv = 0: Figure 1 shows that there is indeed considerable overlap. Around 85% of inside settlement-schools lie within half a kilometer of the child's residence compared to almost 40% of out-of-settlement schools. At the tail of the school distance distribution, of course, outside schools dominate.
Ignoring child gender di¤erences for the moment, consider the following regression equation for school enrollment e isv :
where X isv is a vector of child and household characteristics and v ; sv ; and " isv are village-speci…c, settlement-speci…c, and child-speci…c error components, respectively. The parameter captures the crossing-boundary e¤ect and ( ) is the (possibly) non-linear mapping from school distance to the decision ever to enroll the child.
In the empirical implementation, we let , ;and di¤er by child gender. In particular, this allows us to test the null hypothesis that boy = girl ; as mentioned, we anticipate that girl > 0 and girl > boy : Non-random placement of schools is the principal threat to the validity of OLS estimates of equation (3) . Those villages, and even those settlements within villages, that have a particularly high demand for education (or any other unobserved characteristic positively correlated with school enrollment) may be more likely to receive a school, thus inducing a (positive) correlation between ivs and v and/or sv . To deal with the non-random placement of schools across villages, we use village …xed e¤ects throughout our analysis to purge v .
In addressing the remaining issue of sv , it will be useful to assume
which, if is linear, is tantamount to d isv ? sv j ivs ; X isv ; v . In words, given school settlement location, distance to school (or any function thereof) is uncorrelated with the settlement-speci…c demand for education. The intuition for this conditional exogeneity of d isv is as follows: When isv = 1; an available school lies inside the child's own settlement, which, of course, may signal a high sv , but the distance between the child's household and the within-settlement school is likely to be random. When isv = 0, so that the child's settlement does not have the right type of school, d isv is the distance between the child's residence and an arbitrary location in a neighboring settlement, the one containing the nearest available school. The distance between child and school settlements is-conditional on average distance to school in the village-for all intents and purposes a matter of pure chance, plausibly unrelated to relative demand for education across settlements. With conditional exogeneity of d isv we can investigate the potential correlation of ivs and sv without even having to partial out (d ihsv ). This allows us to work with the simpler regression model
where e = +P( (d isv ); ivs ; X isv ; v ) and P is the linear projection of (d isv ) on the remaining regressors and village dummies. So, e confounds the crossing-boundary e¤ect with that of having a school in one's settlement on reducing distance to school. But, given that isv and d isv are fairly highly correlated, equation (5) should provide more powerful tests of the exogeneity of ivs than equation (3) . This brings us to the two alternative testing strategies:
1. Settlement …xed e¤ects: Recall that because a child's set of available schools di¤ers according to their age (i.e., cohort) and gender, ivs varies within settlements. Moreover, even if ivs were constant within settlements, we could still identify the gender di¤erence boy girl (or e boy e girl ). Settlement …xed e¤ects supersede village …xed e¤ects, purging both v and sv :
2. Instrumental variables with village …xed e¤ects: We exploit the fact that, within villages, public schools are largely allocated to high population settlements. Since we know the number of households in each settlement, we can construct a variable p sv = proportion of households in village v residing in settlement s. Given this school allocation mechanism, we expect
The validity of excluding p sv from equation (5) depends on the extent of intra-village mobility. If those households with a relatively strong demand for education tend to relocate to settlements already having schools or set up new settlements next to existing schools, then settlement population shares could re ‡ect schooling preferences, rendering them inadmissible as instruments. While the establishment of new settlements is far-fetched in our context given long-standing land ownership patterns, the possibility of intra-village migration in response to school availability cannot be as easily dismissed. 7 However, in our analysis of village census data in the Appendix, we fail to …nd evidence of increased migration into settlements with newly established primary schools. This result supports our strategy of treating settlement population shares within a village as exogenous with respect to school availability.
To facilitate IV estimation and comparability across estimators we employ the linear probability model throughout our analysis. Standard errors are clustered at the settlement, the lowest-level sampling unit in the household survey.
Results
To investigate the endogeneity of school location, as just discussed, the …rst four speci…cations in Table 3 exclude distance to school. In the …rst column, we see that, conditional only on village …xed e¤ects and child age, the presence of a school in the settlement increases girls'enrollment rate by 17.5 percentage points, which is very close to the conditional gender gap in school enrollment. In other words, girls with a school in their settlement have practically the same enrollment rate as boys.
Next we control for household wealth using a dummy variable for whether the household is landless along with the log of per-capita household expenditures measured at the time of the survey. Neither variable is a perfect proxy for wealth, but together they should do a reasonable job of capturing such variation. Allowing the coe¢ cients on these variables to di¤er by the gender of the child, we see that girls' enrollment is quite a bit more responsive to wealth than that of boys, but that the coe¢ cients on isv barely change.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 provide evidence on the exogeneity of isv conditional on the village …xed e¤ect, household wealth proxies, and other regressors.
Our …rst procedure involves simply taking out settlement …xed e¤ects. Although the standard errors on e boy and e girl more than double as a consequence, the coe¢ -cient estimates barely di¤er from their counterparts in column (2); the estimate of e girl , moreover, remains statistically signi…cant.
The instrumental variable estimates in column (4) also provide scant evidence of school placement endogeneity. 8 In particular, we would expect upward bias in e boy and e girl , as settlements with stronger education demand are more likely to attract schools. While upward bias does seem present for boys, just the opposite is observed for girls. Looking at the IV estimate of the gender di¤erence e girl e boy , we remain extremely con…dent that the enrollment impact of having an insidesettlement school (inclusive of its e¤ect through distance to school) is greater for girls than for boys. Finally, using the settlement rank instead of the share of population as the instrument (e.g., dummies for …rst and second most populous settlements in the village) makes very little di¤erence for the results.
Accepting now that our estimates of crossing-boundary e¤ects are not likely to be an artifact of school placement decisions, we drop back to the least-squares/village dummy variable estimator and begin to control for distance to school. This is done in linear form in column (5) and with a cubic polynomial in distance in column (6) . In both cases, the isv coe¢ cients fall only marginally relative to column (2) . Figure  2 plots predicted enrollment for boys and girls as a function of distance based on the estimates in column (6) . Removing a school from a settlement, for any given distance, reduces a girl's enrollment by about as much as moving a school three kilometers away from her residence.
Given the paucity of inside-settlement schools at the greater distances, as seen in …gure 1, we also experimented with alternative distance cuto¤s to check whether our estimates of girl and boy are sensitive to the exclusion of far away schools. The results are, in fact, highly robust. For example, re-estimating the model in column (6) using the 4592 children whose most convenient school is within just 500 meters, we obtain b girl = 0:182 (0:51) and b boy = 0:038 (0:036).
Lastly, we investigate the impact of middle school location on primary school enrollment decisions by including variables analogous to isv and d isv for middle schools. The likelihood of having a middle school inside one's settlement is far lower than of having a primary school (16% for boys and 22% for girls) and middle schools are considerably more distant on average as well. Indeed, since the degree of overlap between the distribution of distance for inside and outside settlement middle schools is so much lower than was the case for primary schools (cf., …gure 1), separately identifying crossing-boundary and distance e¤ects for middle school is likely to be far more di¢ cult. Thus, we …nd in column (7) that having a middle school inside the settlement signi…cantly raises enrollment rates for girls but not for boys, paralleling the results for primary school. However, including a cubic polynomial in distance to middle school (column (8)) largely wipes out this middle school crossing-boundary e¤ect. The important result, returning to our main argument, is that the primary school crossing-boundary e¤ects are not driven by correlations between primary and middle school placement; the coe¢ cients on the primary school isv are quite robust (compare columns (6) and (8)).
Salience of Caste-based Stigma

Empirical strategy
The key variable for testing our second hypothesis is an indicator of child-school caste-concordance. Let
(6) In case the nearest school outside the settlement was not contained within any one settlement, we matched it to the nearest settlement and assigned it the corresponding dominant caste.
Means of CC isv by gender, caste, and region are shown in Table 1 . Re ‡ecting the residential patterns already discussed, high-caste children are more than twice as likely overall to have access to a caste-concordant school than low-caste children. Regionally, southern Punjab fares the worst on these terms with only 11% of low-caste children having their most convenient school in a low-caste dominant settlement.
Results
In the …rst column of Table 4 , we introduce caste-status as a determinant of enrollment behavior in a stripped-down model with only gender-age interactions and village …xed e¤ects. Once we look within villages, there is little di¤erence in school enrollment between high and low-caste boys. By contrast, there is a 9:4 percentage point gap in enrollment rates favoring high over low-caste girls. Controlling for household wealth in column (2) using the landless dummy and the per-capita expenditure variable as before lowers this marginal e¤ect of higher caste status to 6:8 percentage points. So a modest share of caste di¤erences in enrollment can be explained by the greater wealth of high-caste households.
Next we investigate the crossing-boundary e¤ect by caste status, conditioning again on distance to school. The results, reported in column (3), are remarkable. Practically the entire positive enrollment e¤ect of having a school in one's settlement that we observed in Table 3 is concentrated among high-caste girls. Low-caste girls appear to be indi¤erent to the presence of an inside-settlement school. One plausible explanation for this …nding is that, as just noted, most low-caste children live in settlements dominated by high-caste households. Given caste-based stigma, the psychic cost of attending a local school if one exists is high for them.
Results in column (4) con…rm our suspicions. Low-caste girls with access to a caste-concordant school enroll at a rate 23 percentage points higher than their counterparts without such schools, whereas there is no signi…cant di¤erence for highcaste girls. For low-caste boys, the child-school caste concordance e¤ect is almost as large as it is for low-caste girls and, again, there is no such e¤ect for high-caste boys. Hence we see, as some of the …eld interviews excerpted above would suggest, that caste-based stigma cuts across gender lines.
Our estimates imply that if all girls were given access to a caste-concordant school within their own settlement (i.e., isv = 1 and CC isv = 1), then the enrollment gap between high and low-caste girls would fall to 2:9 percentage points, which is to say that the enrollment rate of low-caste girls would actually be higher than that of high-caste girls. The same calculation shows an even bigger marginal e¤ect for boys, with low-caste enrollment now exceeding that of high-castes by 14:4 percentage points. These results suggest that, if anything, the latent demand for education is higher among low-caste households than among their high-caste neighbors in the village; in the absence of communal barriers to schooling, they would actually be more likely to send their children to school. Low-status per se does not appear to dampen parents'aspirations for their children.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
We have seen that social constraints can interact in surprising ways to limit educational opportunities for girls. Entry into primary school is substantially discouraged when girls have to cross settlement boundaries to attend, irrespective of the distance they would have to travel. This e¤ect is concentrated among high-caste girls, however; low-caste girls appear indi¤erent to settlement boundaries. But this is because most low-caste children live in settlements dominated by high-caste households and thus face particularly high barriers to attending a local school, if one exists. Indeed, low-caste girls with access to a school in a low-caste dominant community enroll at much higher rates than their counterparts without access to such schools.
Our …ndings on the salience of geographic boundaries and caste-composition of settlements have important implications for school allocation decisions in rural Pakistan. We illustrate this point by comparing the following hypothetical policies targeted to the population of 9-12 year-old children in all PRHS-II villages:
Policy 1: Provide a girl's school to every settlement currently lacking one.
Policy 2: Provide a school to a low-caste dominant settlement in every village currently lacking one.
Based on our estimates (using only statistically signi…cant coe¢ cients), Policy 1 will induce only more high-caste girls to enroll in school, whereas Policy 2 will draw in only additional low-caste boys and girls. To level the playing …eld somewhat on the cost-side, we restrict the …rst policy to settlements with at least a 10% high-caste population and the second policy to villages with at least a 10% lowcaste population, thus avoiding the construction of a large number of "super ‡uous" schools. 10 The question is: Which policy increases enrollment rates most coste¤ectively? Table 5 summarizes the horserace. Our analysis uses estimates from column (4) of Table 4 combined with village census data to obtain population weights for each settlement as well as the proportion of low-caste households within each settlement. 11;12 As mentioned, all the enrollment impacts for boys and low-caste girls of Policy 1 are zero. High caste girls increase their enrollment, but not by much (5.3 percentage points). The reason is that, since higher population settlements typically already have a school, Policy 1 disproportionately serves smaller settlements and thus does not greatly increase school access on a population-weighted basis.
The predicted enrollment response in Northern Punjab is particularly weak. Policy 2, by contrast, does not su¤er the same defect; more populous settlements tend to be in villages without a low-caste dominant school. Thus, Policy 2 greatly boosts the enrollment rates of low-caste children of both genders and, even though these children are in the distinct minority, increases aggregate enrollment by nearly twice as much as Policy 1 (3.4 versus 1.9 percentage points).
Looking at the cost side, we see that implementing Policy 1 requires building a school in 579 (out of 1,031) settlements. On the other hand, for Policy 2 a mere 93 new schools are needed. The pro ‡igacy of Policy 1 relative to Policy 2 is obviously due to its targeting the settlement rather than the village. 13 In sum, Policy 2 delivers twice the overall impact at a sixth of the cost. Moreover, Policy 2 does far better at reaching the educationally disadvantaged low-caste population, especially low-caste girls. The broader message from this analysis is that, where social constraints are prevalent, understanding community structure can be critical to implementing the e¢ cient allocation of public services. Another lesson of this paper is that di¤erences in the returns to education-or in household wealth, for that matter-do not fully account for school enrollment gaps across gender and caste. Variation between groups in the psychic cost of schooling, due to the necessity of crossing communal boundaries to attend, must also be recognized. Given the di¢ culty of designing policies that raise the returns to education, our …ndings thus provide hope that suitably targeted supply-side interventions can mitigate educational inequities. 11 Throughout our simulations we ignore the fact that building new schools will also reduce distance to school. In this sense, the enrollment gains from the policies that we consider are somewhat understated. 12 The population proportion of girls among 9-12 year old children is calculated from our sample and, along with household size, is assumed to be constant across settlements and caste-types. 13 Implicit here is the assumption that capacity constraints are never binding for a new school; they can accomodate any number of additional students induced to enroll. Table A .1 reports regressions of the number of in-migrants on the presence of a boy's or girl's public primary school that include settlement …xed e¤ects and a cubic polynomial in years since 1980 (year dummies gave similar results in all speci…cations). Thus, we are asking whether migration into a particular settlement (we do not have data on out-migration) increases after a school is established. OLS estimates in column (1) and (2) provide no evidence that this is the case, either for boys and girls schools separately or together for any primary school. A panelestimator suitable for count data, the …xed e¤ect poisson, gives similar results in columns (3) and (4), automatically dropping all observations in the 34 settlements that received no migrants over the entire period. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered on settlement (*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1). There are 507 settlements in 165 villages. Dependent variable is an indicator for whether the child was ever enrolled in school. All regressions include the age of child interacted with girl and boy dummy variables. CC is a dummy for whether the most convenient school is in a settlement where the child's own caste is dominant (see notes to Table 3 for definitions of other variables). Initial enrollment 0.616 0.780 0.739 Notes: All figures, except for the initial enrollment rates of 9-12 year-olds, represent changes in the proportion of children in PRHS-II villages who ever enroll in school. Initial enrollment rates are based on means from the estimation sample by caste-type, which are then weighted using village census data to achieve representativeness across caste-type. See text for a description of the policies. 
